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NONRECOURSE MORTGAGE INDEBTEDNESS AS AN
AMOUNT REALIZED: FOOTNOTE 37 REVISITED
by Holly A. Cox
The proper determination of the amount realized' on transfer of prop-
erty subject to a nonrecourse debt2 when the fair market value of the prop-
erty is less than the unpaid balance of the indebtedness has remained an
unresolved issue since the Supreme Court first posed the question in foot-
note 37 of Crane v. Commissioner.3 Footnote 37 suggests that the amount
realized in such a situation should represent the actual economic benefit
received by the taxpayer on disposition of the property, thus limiting the
amount realized to the fair market value of the transferred property. Con-
sistent application of the footnote 37 rationale, however, results in an un-
acceptable tax advantage for investors holding property subject to
nonrecourse financing.4 To avoid this result, recent cases have rejected the
economic benefit rationale of footnote 37, holding that the amount realized
may include tax benefits resulting from the use of nonrecourse debt in ba-
sis. Further, these cases have determined the amount realized without re-
gard to the fair market value of the underlying property or the actual
economic benefit realized by a taxpayer on transfer of the property
financed by nonrecourse debt.5 In light of the statutory language of Inter-
nal Revenue Code section 1001(b) and the holding of Crane v. Commis-
sioner, this precedent is open to challenge.
Resolution of this issue is important to the courts, to the tax bar, and
also to the many investors who seek the tax sheltering benefits and limited
risk that nonrecourse financing can provide. Most investors would be sur-
prised to learn that taxable gain can result from the collapse of a tax shel-
tering business transaction. As Professor Bittker concisely states, the entire
I. The term "amount realized" is defined by I.R.C. § 1001(b) as follows: "The amount
realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money re-
ceived plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received."
2. Nonrecourse financing involves a loan in which the borrower has no personal liabil-
ity for repayment. The lender has recourse only to the underlying security in the event of
default. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1778 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). For this reason,
nonrecourse financing is difficult to obtain. Lending institutions are conservative in estimat-
ing whether the value of the underlying security is sufficient to pay off the loan in the event
of default. Thus, the value of the securing asset must be equal to or greater than the amount
of the loan before an institution will make the loan, and there must be no reasonable expec-
tation of decline in value. The general reputation of the buyer and the economic feasibility
of a successful project are also important considerations to the institutional lender.
3. 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37 (1947).
4. See discussion at section II infra.
5. Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 215, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Estate
of Delman v. Commissioner, [1979] TAx CT. REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380; Tufts v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 764-66 (1978).
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notion is "counter-intuitive. '"6 Recent precedent, however, confirms this
result. This Comment analyzes existing case law in terms of accepted and
fundamental principles of income taxation, and concludes that statutory
means for achieving an equitable tax treatment of the footnote 37 situation
are readily available and are conceptually preferable to the judicial redefi-
nition of "amount realized" advanced in recent cases.
I. GAIN OR Loss ON THE DISPOSITION OF ENCUMBERED PROPERTY
A. In General
The amount of gain or loss recognized on the sale of property is deter-
mined by computing the difference between the adjusted basis of property
and the amount realized at sale. 7 The cost basis and amount realized pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code operate concurrently to give an accu-
rate reflection of a taxpayer's yearly income.8 One function of the cost
basis provision is to insure that the return of a taxpayer's capital invest-
ment is not treated as recognized income.9 As a return of capital is not a
taxable event,'° basis is subtracted from the gross proceeds received on the
sale, the amount realized, to determine the taxpayer's gain. A taxpayer
thus will not be taxed both on the return of capital and on his profits.''
The basis and amount realized provisions of the Code also operate con-
currently with the depreciation provisions. The amount of the annual de-
preciation deductions is intended to represent that portion of the cost of a
capital asset that is attributable to the income that the asset generates in
that tax year.' 2 By deducting this portion of the asset's cost against current
income, the taxpayer is allowed to account periodically for the return of
his capital investment rather than only upon the asset's disposition. In or-
6. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REV. 277,
277 (1978).
7. I.R.C. § 1001(a). I.R.C. § 1012 states that the basis of property shall be its cost
unless otherwise provided. Adjusted basis is defined in I.R.C. § 1016. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(l)
provides that an upward adjustment shall be made for all items properly chargeable to the
capital account, except carrying charges described in § 266 and circulation expenditures de-
scribed in § 173. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) requires that a downward adjustment be made in the
amount of the depreciation allowable under I.R.C. § 167. I.R.C. § 1001(b) defines the
amount realized on the sale or other disposition of property. The text of I.R.C. § 1001(b)
appears at note I supra.
8. See Surrey & Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute- Gross
Income, Deductions, Accounting, Gains and Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 761, 803-05 (1953).
9. 3A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 21.01, at 10 (1977).
10. Id.
11. This concept has been explained as follows:
The key which unlocks the door to understanding here is the general rule that
both the taxpayer and the Commissioner are to be kept whole no matter how
many transactions and permutations occur. Gain is in the end to be com-
pletely taxed once, but only once. Conversely, loss in the end is to be com-
pletely deducted (apart from artificial statutory limitations) once, but not more
than once.
3A J. MERTENS, supra note 9, § 21.01, at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
12. See generally Lischer, Depreciation Policy: Whither Thou Goest, 32 Sw. L.J. 545,
571-73 (1978).
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der to assure that the taxpayer may not take credit for the same return of
capital twice, the Code requires that the taxpayer adjust the basis of the
asset downward in an amount equal to the depreciation allowable.' 3
If a cash transaction is involved, a purchaser's cost basis in property is
simply the amount of cash paid for the property; the amount realized on its
sale is the amount of cash received. If the taxpayer acquires property ei-
ther by means of a purchase-money mortgage or by assumption of existing
liabilities, his cost basis in the property includes the amount of that indebt-
edness and is not limited to the taxpayer's equity therein.' 4 As the tax-
payer is personally liable for the indebtedness, it is a very real part of his
cost for the property even though the entire purchase price will not be paid
until some future date. 5
The amount of the taxpayer's recourse liabilities also is included as an
amount realized on the subsequent disposition of the encumbered prop-
erty. 6 When a purchaser assumes or takes subject to a mortgage for which
the seller was personally liable, the seller is in roughly the same position as
if the purchaser had paid the seller for the full value of the property in
cash and the seller in turn had paid the mortgagee. 7 The seller therefore
has realized an economic benefit in the amount of the mortgage, and the
amount of the mortgage properly is considered as an amount realized.
When property is encumbered by a nonrecourse mortgage, however, the
propriety of including the amount of the mortgage either in the cost basis
of the property or in the amount realized on disposition of the property is
less certain. The leading judicial treatment of this issue is the United
States Supreme Court decision of Crane v. Commissioner.' 8
B. Crane v. Commissioner
In Crane the taxpayer inherited an apartment building subject to a
mortgage that secured a principal debt of $255,000 and unpaid interest of
$7,042.50. Pursuant to an agreement with the mortgagee, the taxpayer,
Mrs. Crane, continued to manage the property and pay all expenses. For
seven years, Mrs. Crane claimed deductions for taxes, operating expenses,
interest, and depreciation. Despite her efforts, the interest due doubled
and the mortgagee threatened foreclosure. Consequently, Mrs. Crane sold
the building to a third party, who took the property subject to the mort-
gage and paid $3,000 cash, including selling expenses of $500. Mrs. Crane
reported a taxable gain of $1,250, reasoning that her basis in the property
was zero, that the amount she realized was $2,500, and that half of this
13. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2).
14. 3A J. MERTENS, supra note 9, § 21.11, at 41. For a general discussion of the inclu-
sion of indebtedness in cost basis, see Landis, Liabilities and Purchase Price, 27 TAX LAW. 67
(1973).
15. 3A J. MERTENS, supra note 9, § 21.11, at 41.
16. United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938). See also Adams v. Commis-
sioner, 58 T.C. 41, 64 (1972).
17. Id; see note 42 infra.
18. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
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amount was taxable income because the property sold was a capital asset.
The Commissioner, however, computed Mrs. Crane's gain to be
$23,767.03. This figure was based on an adjusted basis that included the
full value of the property inherited and an amount realized that included
the full amount of the indebtedness. The Supreme Court upheld the Com-
missioner's assessment.' 9
Basis. Under section 113(a)(5) of the Revenue Act of 1938,20 Mrs. Crane's
basis was the fair market value of the property she inherited. For federal
estate tax purposes, Mrs. Crane's property had been valued at $262,042.50,
equal to the amount of the mortgage debt plus the unpaid interest. 21 To
determine the fair market value of the property, the Court found it neces-
sary to define the word "property" for purposes of applying the Revenue
Act. Mrs. Crane argued that her inheritance had no net value because her
equity in the property was zero. She insisted, therefore, that the fair mar-
ket value of her property was zero and consequently the basis in her inher-
itance was zero. Thus, Mrs. Crane computed her gain to be $2,500, the
difference between a zero basis and $2,500 net cash received on the trans-
fer. The Court rejected this contention, concluding that the fair market
value of the property she inherited was the value of the land and buildings
themselves undiminished by mortgages, and not the value of the equity
therein.22
The Court discussed three reasons by which it arrived at its holding.
The Court first determined that "property" is either the physical asset that
is the subject of ownership or the sum of the owner's rights to control and
dispose of the asset.23 Secondly, the Court noted that the regulations re-
quired that the value of inherited property be determined without regard
to any mortgage indebtedness attached to the property.24 Finally, and
most importantly, the Court emphasized that a conclusion that "property"
meant equity would have a devastating effect on the depreciation deduc-
tion.25 The Court noted that the Revenue Act required that the basis from
which the depreciation deduction is allowed be identical to the basis used
to calculate gain or loss on the sale of property. Thus, the Court concluded
that if the basis were limited to Mrs. Crane's equity, the annual allowance
for depreciation also would have to be calculated with regard to an equity
19. Id. at 14.
20. Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 113(a), 52 Stat. 447, 490 (1938) provided that the basis of
property acquired from a decedent is the fair market value of the property. Presently, I.R.C.
§ 1014 provides the same treatment.
21. 331 U.S. at 6.
22. Id at Ii; accord, Commissioner v. Fortee Properties, Inc., 211 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.
1954).
23. 331 U.S. at 6. The Court stated that the words of the Revenue Act should be given
their ordinary and everyday meaning and thus used the dictionary definition of the word
"property." Id.
24. Id at 7.
25. Id at 9. For a further discussion of the depreciation deductions in I.R.C. § 167, see
text at notes 12 & 13 supra.
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basis, 26 and consequently, the amount of the deductions would not reflect
the corresponding physical exhaustion of the property.2' Additionally, the
taxpayer would be able to control the timing of his deductions by changing
his equity in the property.28 Furthermore, the Court noted that even if the
Revenue Act allowed the depreciation deductions to be calculated with
reference to the value of the property and then subtracted from the tax-
payer's equity therein,29 a negative basis could result, a concept the Court
found objectionable.3" Finally, the Court found that the administrative
burden that would result from the use of an equity basis would be unac-
ceptable. 3 '
The fact that the Court found the fair market value of the property to be
exactly equal to the mortgage indebtedness is a coincidence that should
not lead one to conclude that Crane stands for the proposition that mort-
26. 331 U.S. at 9 n.26.
27. Id at 9.
28. Id at 10. It is a fundamental principle of the tax law that a taxpayer will not be
allowed to manipulate the timing of his depreciation deductions. See Commissioner v. Ken-
nedy Laundry Co., 133 F.2d 660 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943). In furtherance
of this objective, the Code requires that basis be reduced by the amount of depreciation
allowable, whether or not it is taken. I.R.C. § 1016.
29. 331 U.S. at 9 n.26.
30. The Tax Court also has rejected the notion of a negative basis. Beulah B. Crane, 3
T.C. 585, 591 (1944). Congressional disapproval of a negative basis can be found in I.R.C. §
362(c)(2). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.362-2(b) (1955). Nevertheless, some support for the con-
cept of a negative basis can be found in Easson v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir.
1961), and in Judge Magruder's concurring opinion in Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 459-
60 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951). In Parker the taxpayer acquired prop-
erty subject to an unassumed mortgage of $273,000 with no capital investment. Under the
Crane doctrine, $273,000 was used as the basis from which depreciation in the amount of
$45,000 was taken. During his ownership, the taxpayer paid $14,000 on the principal. Thus,
the unpaid balance of the debt was $259,000 when the property was abandoned to the mort-
gagee. The taxpayer's adjusted basis at the time of the transfer was $228,000. The court
held that the unpaid balance of the mortgage was an amount realized under Crane and
found the taxpayer had realized gain in the amount of $3 1,000.
Judge Magruder reached the same result through the use of an equity basis. By excluding
the unpaid portion of the debt from cost basis, the original basis was limited to the $14,000
paid toward satisfaction of the mortgage. Exclusion of the debt from the amount realized
limited the amount realized to zero. Judge Magruder reasoned that because the taxpayer
received no cash consideration on the transfer of the property, he had not realized any
amount under I.R.C. § 1001(b). The difference between the majority's computations and
Judge Magruder's can be shown as follows:
Majority Magruder
Original Cost $273,000 -0-
Addition to Basis -0- $14,000
Depreciation Allowed $45,000 $45,000
Adjusted Basis $228,000 ($31,000)
Amount Realized $259,000 -0-
Gain Recognized $31,000 $31,000
M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEAD-
ING CASES AND CONCEPTS 13.01 (2d ed. 1979). For further discussion of the concept of a
negative basis, see generally Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1352 (1962).
31. 331 U.S. at 10. Taking the mortgagor's equity as the basis would require the basis
to be changed with each payment on the mortgage. This would result in repeated basis and
allowance calculations.
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gage indebtedness is automatically included in basis. Crane in fact states
that mortgage indebtedness is not a factor in determining basis.32 Basis,
whether cost basis or fair market value basis, is determined as an amount
undiminished by any nonrecourse indebtedness to which the property is
subject.33 By way of example, had Mrs. Crane inherited property with a
value less than the amount of the nonrecourse indebtedness, the Court
properly would have given her a basis equal to the fair market value of the
property only.34
Amount Realized. Following the literal language of section 111 (b) of the
Revenue Act of 1938,'3 Mrs. Crane argued that the only money she re-
ceived, and therefore the only amount realized, was the $2,500 cash paid
by the buyer. The Court disagreed with Mrs. Crane's analysis, stating that
limiting her amount realized to the actual cash received would result in
"the absurdity that [Mrs. Crane] sold a quarter-of-a-million dollar prop-
erty for roughly one per cent of its value, and took a 99 per cent loss.""
The Court emphasized that the amount realized provision could not be
construed so as to "frustrate the Act as a whole,"37 and held that the
amount realized was not limited to the $2,500 cash received, but included
the amount of the mortgage as well.38 The Court noted that prior judicial
decisions had established the general rule that amount realized is not lim-
ited to the actual receipt of money or other property, but also encompasses
the receipt of any economic benefit accruing to a taxpayer.39 Specifically,
32. Id at 11.
33. Eg., Gibson Prods. Co. v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1978). In
Gibson Products the court stated, "[T]he Crane doctrine does not establish an 'iron-clad
guarantee' that all nonrecourse liabilities may be included in a taxpayer's cost basis." Id at
1119. But see Brountas v. Commissioner, [1980] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 2, H-1, H-13
(T.C. Jan. 3, 1980) (seemingly advancing an iron-clad rule that when nonrecourse indebted-
ness is included in amount realized, it is also included automatically in cost basis in order to
maintain symmetry between the basis and amount realized provisions of the Code).
34. Accord, Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine.: An Imagi-
nary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX. L. REV. 159, 165 (1966).
35. The Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 11 l(b), 52 Stat. 447, 484 contains
the same amount realized provision as is now embodied in I.R.C. § 1001(b). The statutory
language appears at note I supra.
36. 331 U.S. at 13.
37. Id
38. Id.
39. Id. Eg., United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938) (assumption and pay-
ment of corporation's bonded indebtedness is tantamount to the receipt of cash and as such
is to be treated an income); Haass v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 948, 955 (1938) (assumption
of indebtedness will be regarded as the receipt of "other property or money," expressly fol-
lowing Brons Hotels, Inc., 34 B.T.A. 376 (1936)); Brons Hotels, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34
B.T.A. 376, 379, 381 (1936) (faced with the challenge that the assumption of indebtedness
was not "money" or "other property" within the amount realized provision of the Code, the
Board of Tax Appeals found that a taxpayer who has been relieved of a debt that has been
used as part of cost basis should be deemed to have received a cash equivalent when the debt
passes to the transferee). See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729
(1929) (payment by employer of employee's income taxes is income to the employee);
United States v. Boston & Maine R.R., 279 U.S. 732, 734 (1929) (payment of lessor's income
taxes according to lease agreement is income to lessor); cf. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 8
(1935) (alimony payments are not income but are paid in discharge of the general obligation
to support).
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the Court cited United States v. Hendler,4° which held that the assumption
of a recourse debt by another was equivalent to the receipt of cash by the
taxpayer.4 The Hendler decision rested on the theory that on the transfer
of encumbered property the transferor realizes a benefit "as real and sub-
stantial as if the money had been paid it and then paid over by it to its
creditors."42 Mrs. Crane conceded that, on the authority of Hendler, if her
transferee had taken the property subject to a mortgage for which she was
personally liable, she would have benefitted and realized the full amount
of the indebtedness. Nevertheless, Mrs. Crane asserted that she did not
receive the same benefit as described in Hendler because her transferee
had taken the property subject to a mortgage for which she was not per-
sonally liable. The Court disagreed and sought to define the benefit Mrs.
Crane had realized. The Court reasoned that the economic realities of the
circumstances required the conclusion that a mortgagor holding property
valued at a figure equal to or greater than the amount of the mortgage the
property secures must treat the debt as though it were a personal obliga-
tion.43 By this analysis, the Court equated recourse with nonrecourse in-
debtedness. 4"
40. 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
41. Id. at 566. The Hendler doctrine is now embodied in I.R.C. §§ 357(c), 358(d),
1031(d).
42. 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938). Actually, if the buyer assumes the debt, the seller remains
primarily liable on the debt and has an action over against the buyer unless the lender has
accepted the assignment. If the buyer takes the property subject to the debt, the seller like-
wise remains personally liable, and is subrogated to the lender's right to foreclose against the
secured property. Thus, the benefit to the seller may not be strictly identical to the situation
where the buyer has transferred cash. In most cases, however, the result will be roughly the
same. See Bittker, supra note 6, at 278.
43. 331 U.S. at 14. Professor Bittker suggests that the Court's treatment of the nonre-
course liability as a personal obligation for the purposes of determining gain on the transfer
of property is in accord with the economic reality of the specific fact situation before the
Court. Bittker, supra note 6, at 282. Bittker suggests that individuals with no assets other
than mortgaged property will see little distinction between recourse and nonrecourse financ-
ing. Id. These individuals are more than likely unconcerned with the tax sheltering aspects
of nonrecourse financing as they have no other assets to shelter. For a discussion of the tax
sheltering aspects of nonrecourse financing, see section II infra.
44. 331 U.S. at 14. In concluding that Mrs. Crane would treat the liability as a personal
obligation, the Court noted, for example, that she had treated the gross rentals from the
apartment building as income to her, used the money to pay the interest on the indebtedness,
and then taken a deduction for the interest paid. 1d at 14 n.38. The Court was correct in
concluding that a mortgagor will treat the indebtedness as personal to him for the purposes
of obtaining available tax deductions. Nevertheless, it may be incorrect to assume further
that all mortgagors will treat a nonrecourse indebtedness as a personal obligation for all
purposes. Most commentators interpret the Court's reasoning to mean that all mortgagors
holding property with a value at least equal to the indebtedness will have the same incentive
to satisfy the debt as the Court identified Mrs. Crane as having. See, e.g., Adams, supra note
34, at 165; Del Cotto, Basis andAmount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax
Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 75 (1969). But see Adams, supra note
34, at 175, in which the author suggests that the Court was "sadly misled" in this assump-
tion; Bittker, supra note 6, at 281. It is correct to conclude that an individual who has not
sought nonrecourse financing primarily for the tax sheltering benefits it affords will treat the
obligation as a personal one. See note 43 supra. When applied to the sophisticated investor
seeking the tax sheltering aspects of nonrecourse financing, however, such reasoning ignores
the economic realities of the situation. The availability of depreciation deductions without
actual investment, see note 62 infra, and the availability of the interest deduction, see I.R.C.
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The Court's conclusion that a mortgagor holding property with a fair
market value at least equal to the nonrecourse indebtedness will treat that
obligation as a personal one in all cases may be questionable in light of
economic realities. It is nevertheless apparent that this fiction was essential
to the Court's determination that Mrs. Crane had realized an amount that
included the amount of the nonrecourse indebtedness. 45 The Court could
have relied solely on the proposition that equity and the necessary sym-
metrical relationship between basis and amount realized supported the in-
clusion of nonrecourse debt in amount realized when the debt has been
included in basis. The opinion strongly suggests, however, that the pres-
ence of an economic benefit that can be equated with the receipt of cash or
property is necessary to justify the inclusion of an item as an amount real-
ized.46
The importance of an actual economic benefit to the determination of
amount realized is further evidenced in the opinion's famous footnote 37,47
in which the Court stated:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the
mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a
benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem
might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or
transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is
not this case.48
The Court thus recognized that its analysis focusing on the economic bene-
fit to the taxpayer will not support the inclusion of the full amount of non-
recourse indebtedness as an amount realized when the value of the
§ 163, are the main concerns of the tax shelter seeking investor. Indeed, this may be the
mortgagor's only interest in.the property, and he may have no incentive whatsoever to sat-
isfy the debt. In fact, it is highly probable that when the interest and depreciation deduc-
tions are no longer adequate to shelter the outside ordinary income of the taxpayer-
mortgagor, he will merely allow the property to be repossessed and invest again in another
tax sheltering venture. Many times even the mortgagee does not expect the debt to be re-
paid. Assuming the mortgagee is a commercial lender, its interest in the investment lies in
the rate of return it will receive from the interest charged. Repayment of the debt is of no
concern to the lender as long as the value of the securing asset remains at least equal to the
amount of the indebtedness. The lender can readily foreclose and get its investment back.
Professor Bittker appears to have reached a similar conclusion:
The Court was, of course, right in asserting that the owner of mortgaged prop-
erty must keep up the payments if he wants to retain the property and thatfor
this period of time, he must treat the debt as a personal obligation whether he
is personally liable or not. It does not follow, however, that the benefit to him
from transferring the property subject to the mortgage is the same in both
cases.
Bittker, supra note 6, at 281 (emphasis in original).
45. See Adams, supra note 34, at 169 (concluding that the Crane Court found the re-
ceipt of an economic benefit essential); cf. Del Cotto, supra note 44, at 84 (concluding that
the economic benefit reasoning was not essential to the decision).
46. Cf. Brountas v. Commissioner, [1980] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 2, H-I, H-13
(T.C. Jan. 3, 1980) (concluding that the Crane doctrine is basically a symmetrical one).
47. Footnote 37 has been labeled the most famous footnote in tax history. Halpern,
Footnote 37 and the Crane Case.- The Problem that Never Realy Was, 6 J. REAL EST. TAX.
197, 199 (1979); Bittker, supra note 6, at 277.
48. 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
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property is less than the nonrecourse mortgage.49 As the mortgagee cannot
reach the taxpayer's personal holdings to satisfy the debt, the taxpayer is
freed from liability on the transfer of the property and thereby realizes an
economic benefit, but only to the extent of the fair market value of the
property.50 The amount of the indebtedness in excess of the property's fair
market value thus may not be considered an amount realized.
5 I
Despite the Court's strong reliance on the economic benefit theory, the
Court did indicate a possible alternative basis for its holding:
The crux of this case, really, is whether the law permits [Mrs. Crane]
to exclude allowable deductions from consideration in computing
gain. We have already showed that, if it does, the taxpayer can enjoy
a double deduction, in effect, on the same loss of assets. The Six-
teenth Amendment does not require that result any more than does
the Act itself.5
2
49. Most commentators agree. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 34, at 169; Bittker, supra
note 6, at 283-84; Del Cotto, Sales and Other Dispositions of Property Under Section 1001."
The Taxable Event, Amount Realized, and Related Problems of Basis, 26 BUFFALO L. REV.
219, 318 (1977); Del Cotto, supra note 44, at 85; Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXES
719, 731 (1975); Halpern, supra note 47, at 216; Handler, Tax Consequences of Mortgage
Foreclosures and Transfers of Real Property to the Mortgagee, 31 TAX L. REV. 193, 226
(1976); Lurie, Mortgages with "'Negative Equities" and "'Negative Bases" 10 N.Y.U. INST.
FED. TAX. 71, 86 (1952); McGuire, Tax Shelter Partnerships-Liabilities in Excess of Basis,
36 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1443, 1468-69 (1978). A taxpayer holding property worth less
than the amount of the financing thereon in fact has incentive to abandon the property
rather than satisfy the debt. Default is, however, not entirely without consequence to the
taxpayer. A default on a nonrecourse loan can do severe harm to a taxpayer's credit rating
and reputation, and thus there may indeed by an incentive to satisfy the mortgage. It is
generally agreed, however, that the requisite incentive to satisfy the debt obligation is lack-
ing, and thus it is economically unrealistic to include anything above the fair market value
of the property as an amount realized.
50. See Del Cotto, supra note 44, at 85.
51. There is some case support for limiting the amount realized to the fair market value
of the property. See Leland S. Collins, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467 (1963) (holding income is
limited to the amount of a debtor's assets that are freed by the debt cancellation; therefore,
the amount of the indebtedness released, or the fair market value of the underlying security,
is the proper measure of the amount realized). Collins, however, deals only with cancella-
tion of indebtedness income, not with gain realized on the transfer of property. A recent
case, Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, [1979] TAX CT, REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380,
holds that the cancellation of indebtedness theory does not apply to the transfer of
nonrecourse financed property. See note 122 infra and accompanying text.
52. 331 U.S. at 15-16 (footnote omitted). U.S. CONST. amend. XVI provides: "The
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source de-
rived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration." There is no settled definition of income. I.R.C. § 61 simply states that "gross
income means all income from whatever source derived." Several more precise definitions
of income have been advanced. In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920), the Court
characterized income as "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both com-
bined." In a subsequent case, Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431
(1955,), income was defined as "accessions to wealth." The concept of income is perhaps
more easily understood as encompassing any "economic benefit." W. ANDREWS, BASIC
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 39 (1979). It is generally agreed that the receipt of an eco-
nomic benefit is a prerequisite to a finding that a taxpayer has received income and thus has
realized this amount. See id; Adams, supra note 34, at 169. Mrs. Crane contended that the
Court was attempting to tax her on an amount not properly considered income under the
sixteenth amendment because she realized no economic benefit on the transfer of her prop-
erty. 331 U.S. at 15. Mrs. Crane's theory finds support in Adams, supra note 34, at 181.
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This language implies that the Court was concerned largely with the tax
equities underlying the transaction. The Court had noted previously that
limiting the amount realized to the cash received while allowing a basis
that includes the nonrecourse liability would cause the absurd result that
Mrs. Crane had realized a ninety-nine per cent loss. 53 Because she had
computed depreciation deductions with reference to the full fair market
value of the property, the double deduction referred to in the quoted lan-
guage would occur if Mrs. Crane's basis did not include the nonrecourse
liability. If her basis were zero, as she claimed, the amount of these deduc-
tions could not reduce her basis without producing a negative basis.
Therefore, unless a negative basis could be tolerated,54 she would be able
to account for her return of capital both by current deduction and on final
disposition.5
The Court's criticism of the possibility of a double deduction indicates
that the Court recognized the practical need to prevent double accounting
of a return of capital. It is doubtful, however, that the Court found such
practical needs sufficient in themselves to justify alteration of the statutory
definition of amount realized. Rather, it is apparent that the Court inter-
preted the Revenue Act to require a finding of economic benefit before an
amount could be realized, a requirement the Court satisfied when it con-
cluded that the same economic benefit results from the transfer of nonre-
course-financed property as accrues from the transfer of recourse-financed
property. Thus, it can be concluded fairly that the Court's economic bene-
fit approach is more than a mere "balancing entry" to obtain the desired
result.56 Rather, the Court found the existence of an economic benefit a
prerequisite to realization.57
II. THE NONRECOURSE TAX SHELTER AND FOOTNOTE 37
The Crane rule laid the foundation for one of the most notable tax shel-
ters presently available to the investor. 8 Cases decided subsequent to
53. 331 U.S. at 13.
54. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
55. The double deduction was first referred to by Judge Learned Hand in the circuit
court of appeals decision. Commissioner v. Crane, 153 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1945).
56. See Bittker, supra note 6, at 282, 284. Bittker suggests that the economic benefit
theory is "wholly fallacious" and "can be justified only if the amount realized by a taxpayer
who disposes of property encumbered by nonrecourse debt in excess of its basis is viewed as
a balancing entry, which brings the tax results into conformity with economic reality." Id
at 284. See also Brountas v. Commissioner, [1980] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 2, H-I, H-
13 (T.C. Jan. 3, 1980), in which the court stated, "The Crane doctrine is basically a symmet-
rical one-a taxpayer includes nonrecourse liabilities in his basis, but must also include such
liabilities in the amount he realizes upon dispositions of the encumbered property."
57. Realization is a statutory prerequisite to taxation, Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189, 207 (1920), and is considered by some to be a constitutional prerequisite as well. See
Mullock, The ConstitutionalAspects of Realization, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 615, 616 (1970); cf.
Lowndes, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 151, 172 (1964) (con-
cluding realization probably is not constitutionally required). See also note 52 supra.
58. The function of a tax shelter is the creation of tax deductions that can be taken not
only against the income produced by the tax sheltered investment but also against other
unrelated income. The investment form most frequently used to construct the tax shelter is
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Crane expanded the Crane basis rule to include nonrecourse liabilities in a
taxpayer's cost basis under Code section 1012." 9 Even though nonrecourse
financing does not represent an actual cost to the taxpayer, these cases
have justified inclusion of the nonrecourse debt in cost basis at least par-
tially on the assumption that as long as the value of the securing asset
equals or exceeds the encumbrance, the taxpayer will eventually make a
capital investment in the amount of the indebtedness in order to retain the
secured property.60 The tax shelter arises because the inclusion of nonre-
course liabilities in cost basis of depreciable property will often result in a
taxpayer's being allowed depreciation deductions6' in excess of his actual
cash investment. 62 These depreciation deductions can be used to offset or-
the limited partnership. For a discussion of the benefits of the limited partnership and an
introduction to tax shelters generally, see Wiesner, Tax Shelters-A Survey of the Impact of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 33 TAX L. REV. 5 (1977).
59. See, e.g., Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926
(1951); Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. 1969-1 C.B. 21; Blackstone
Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801 (1949), acq. 1949-2 C.B. 1. For a discussion of
the propriety of the inclusion of nonrecourse indebtedness in cost basis, see Del Cotto, supra
note 44, at 71-76.
The Crane doctrine originally applied to sales of property. Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d
455, 458-59 (1st Cir. 1950), extended the application of the doctrine to the disposition of
property by abandonment. Cf. Commissioner v. Crane, 153 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1945)
(abandonment of property not a taxable event). Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, [1979]
TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380, extends the Crane doctrine to the repossession
of mortgaged property. For a discussion of the application of the Crane doctrine to disposi-
tions by gift and transfers at death, see Del Cotto, supra note 44, at 89-95. In addition,
Crane involved a voluntary sale. A division of authority exists on the question of whether
payments to the mortgagee of condemned property are includable as an amount realized by
the seller on an involuntary sale. See Commissioner v. Fortee Properties, Inc., 211 F.2d 915,
916 (2d Cir. 1954) (condemnation award to mortgagee not a recognizable gain to owner of
condemned property), aft'd, 259 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1958).
60. Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340, 351-52 (1966), acq. 1969-1 C.B. 21. In
Mayerson the court stated:
The element of the lack of personal liability has little real significance due
to common business practices. . . . Taxpayers who are not personally liable
for encumbrances on property should be allowed depreciation deductions af-
fording competitive equality with taxpayers who are personally liable for en-
cumbrances or taxpayers who own unencumbered property. The effect of
such a policy is to give the taxpayer an advance credit for the amount of the
mortgage. This appears to be reasonable since it can be assumed that a capital
investment in the amount of the mortgage will eventually occur despite the
absence of personal liability.
One recent case concludes that because nonrecourse indebtedness will be included as an
amount realized on the disposition of the encumbered property, e.g., Tufts v. Commissioner,
70 T.C. 756 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-2258 (5th Cir. Apr. 23, 1979), it must also be
included in cost basis, regardless of the fair market value of the securing property. Brountas
v. Commissioner, [1980] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 2, H-1, H-13 (T.C. Jan. 3, 1980). For a
further discussion of Tufts and related cases, see section III infra.
61. The depreciation deduction is found in I.R.C. § 167. An annual deduction is al-
lowed for the wear, tear, and physical exhaustion of business or investment properties. The
purpose of the deduction is not to measure the actual physical exhaustion of the asset.
Rather, the deduction is designed to allow the taxpayer to recoup his original investment
over the period of the useful life of the asset. See generally J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 62 (2d ed. 1973).
62. This feature is the key to the working of any tax shelter. Typically, the taxpayer
borrows a substantial amount of the capital needed to purchase the investment. This use of
borrowed funds is called leverage. Under Crane and subsequent decisions borrowed funds
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dinary rental income from the property, and if there is an excess, to shelter
the taxpayer's other outside ordinary income. The result is magnified if
accelerated depreciation is available. 63 The taxpayer has an additional ad-
vantage in that the sale of investment property will generally result in capi-
tal gain.' Since the depreciation deductions originally reduced the
taxpayer's ordinary income, the taxpayer has effectively converted ordi-
nary income into capital gain.65
Application of the amount realized portion of the Crane holding sub-
stantially eliminates the tax advantage of nonrecourse financing by includ-
ing the amount of depreciation deductions taken in excess of actual
investment as gain on the property's subsequent disposition. This result is
demonstrated by a hypothetical investment involving the following figures:
Cost Basis $100x (100% nonrecourse financing)





In this example, the taxpayer has acquired property with no actual cash
investment. Under Crane his basis includes the $1 00x nonrecourse financ-
ing. Assume the taxpayer takes $40x depreciation over the course of two
years. If he has not yet begun to amortize the mortgage, deductions exceed
investment by $40x. The taxpayer then sells the property to a buyer who
pays $10x cash boot and takes the property subject to the mortgage. Crane
requires the amount realized to be $110x: the $10x cash boot plus the
$100x indebtedness. The taxpayer's gain is then $50x; $10x represents the
cash received, and $40x equals the amount of depreciation taken over in-
vestment. The amount claimed as depreciation in excess of investment has
thus been effectively recaptured as gain. Although the taxpayer may have
realized substantial tax advantages by the deferral of gain recognition66
are included as part of the taxpayer's cost basis. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
From this basis the annual depreciation deduction is taken. I.R.C. § 167. If the property is
heavily leveraged, the allowable depreciation is likely to exceed the taxpayer's actual cash
contribution. Thus, the more heavily leveraged the asset is, the greater the benefit of the tax
shelter. Deferral of the recognition of income is also a benefit of a tax shelter. Because the
shelter results in substantial losses during the initial years, income realized during these
years will be sheltered from taxation. For a general discussion of the leverage and deferral
aspects of a tax shelter, see Wiesner, supra note 58, at 6.
Congressional reaction to tax shelters is evidenced in I.R.C. § 465, which limits the
amount of loss and depreciation deductions available to a taxpayer to the amount at which
the taxpayer is at risk. A taxpayer is not considered at risk with respect to nonrecourse
financing. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4). I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D)(i), however, expressly excludes real es-
tate investments from the at-risk limitation, leaving such investments the only area where
depreciation can be taken without regard to the at-risk limitation. For a general discussion
of the workings of I.R.C. § 465, see Collins & Doliner, The 'At Risk" Provisions.- The Inter-
nalRevenue Code's New Double Basis Concept, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 185, 200 (1977).
63. I.R.C. § 167(b)(2).
64. I.R.C. § 1231.
65. The benefit of the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain for § 1231 prop-
erty is limited, however, by the recapture provisions of I.R.C. §§ 1245 & 1250.
66. See note 62 supra.
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and the possible conversion of ordinary income into capital gain,67 inclu-
sion of the amount of the nonrecourse indebtedness as an amount realized
assures at least a partial recoupment of the earlier deductions taken in ex-
cess of investment. Recapture of the excess deductions results whether (a)
the inclusion of the nonrecourse indebtedness is justified under the eco-
nomic benefit theory applied in Crane or (b) simply by recognizing that tax
equity requires a balancing entry adjustment to amount realized to achieve
the desired result.
The choice of approach does make a difference when the value of the
transferred property has fallen below the face amount of the nonrecourse
mortgage. The economic benefit analysis has been criticized because it
does not produce a satisfactory result in this situation.68 Emphasis on the
tax equity approach would require that the full amount of the mortgage be
included as an amount realized in order to recapture the full extent of past
depreciation deductions taken in excess of economic investment. The dif-
ference in approach can be illustrated by the following figures:
Economic Benefit Tax Equity
Cost Basis $100x $10Ox
Fair Market Value $ 50x $ 50x
Adjusted Basis $ 60x $ 60x
Cash Received on -0- -0-
Disposition
Amount Realized $ 50x $100x
Gain/Loss ($1Ox) $40x
Using the economic benefit approach, the gain on disposition is computed
as the difference between the adjusted basis, $60x, and the amount real-
ized, $50x. Thus, use of the fair market value as the maximum limit on the
amount realized results in a loss of $ lOx. Since the taxpayer has taken
$40x in depreciation deductions on a zero cash investment and can claim a
loss of $10x on disposition, the taxpayer has received a double deduction
resulting in a clear windfall. In contrast, the tax equity approach results in
a gain of $40x, or the differences between the adjusted basis, $60x, and the
unpaid balance of the nonrecourse indebtedness, $100x. Recognition of
the functional relation between basis and amount realized thus recaptures
the $40x previously claimed as depreciation and prevents the recognition
of a loss. This is clearly the more equitable and reasonable result.
Taxpayers in recent cases have argued that the Crane decision rests
solely on the economic benefit theory and that footnote 37 requires the
amount realized to be limited to the fair market value of property trans-
ferred when the value of the property is less than the mortgage it secures.69
67. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
68. A strong criticism of the economic benefit theory appears in Bittker, supra note 6, at
284 n. 14, in which he states, "[I1n my view, the economic benefit theory should be rejected as
wholly fallacious, in order to make way for a more comprehensive balancing entry theory."
In commenting on the Court's theoretical misuse of the economic benefit theory, Bittker
states, "Since taxpayers cannot benefit from being 'relieved' of liabilities for which they are
not liable, the contrary theory of Crane was bound, as footnote 37 demonstrates, to generate
anomalies." Id at 284.
69. Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978);
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The courts, however, have consistently held otherwise. In Millar v. Com-
missioner7' and Tufts v. Commissioner7 the courts rejected footnote 37 as
a limitation on the amount realized and included the unpaid balance of the
mortgage indebtedness as an amount realized using a theory of tax benefit.
The most current decision, Estate of Delman v. Commissioner,7 2 expressly
affirms the holdings of Millar and Tufts.
III. POST-CRANE DECISIONS
Milar v. Commissioner7 was the first case to address directly the issue
presented in footnote 37. In Millar the taxpayers were shareholders of a
subchapter S corporation engaged in strip-mining operations. To acquire
$500,000 in working capital the taxpayers executed nonrecourse notes se-
cured by their stock in the corporation. After contributing the $500,000 to
the corporation, the taxpayers were entitled to a $500,000 basis.7 4 The cor-
poration suffered substantial operating losses, which along with investment
tax credits and interest payments on the notes, were reflected in downward
adjustments to the taxpayers' bases. The strip-mining venture subse-
quently failed, rendering the stock in the corporation worthless. When the
taxpayers defaulted on the note payments, the holder of the notes fore-
closed and acquired the stock. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that on the authority of Crane the taxpayers realized a
gain on the transfer of the stock, computed as the difference between the
adjusted basis of the stock ($40,000) and the unpaid balance of the nonre-
course notes ($245,000)." The court justified this result by emphasizing
the tax advantage the taxpayers realized by including the amount of the
debt in the original basis of their stock.7 6 Specifically, taxpayers had been
allowed to take $205,000 in deductions against an original basis that in-
cluded the full amount of a nonrecourse mortgage, upon which no pay-
ment had been made. Significantly, the court interpreted the tax equity
analysis to be the "principal reasoning" of Crane77 and emphasized that
limiting the amount realized to the actual economic benefit realized by the
taxpayers at the time the property was transferred would result in a wind-
fall to the taxpayers.78 The Millar holding thus effectively required the
taxpayers to account for the inclusion in basis of a debt that later events
indicated would not be repaid as an amount realized on a subsequent
transfer.
Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, [1979] TAX. CT. REP. (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380; Tufts v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978).
70. 577 F.2d 212, 215 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
71. 70 T.C. 756, 766 (1978).
72. [1979] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380. See also Brountas v. Commis-
sioner, [1980] DAILY TAX REP. No. 2, H-i (T.C. Jan. 3, 1980).
73. 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
74. I.R.C. § 1376(a).
75. 577 F.2d at 216.
76. Id.




Confronted with similar facts, the Tax Court, in Tufts v. Commis-
sioner,79 followed the holding and reasoning in Millar. In Tufts the tax-
payers were general partners in a partnership that entered into a building
loan agreement to finance construction of an apartment complex. The
lender advanced the partnership $1,851,000 in exchange for a deed of trust
and a note for which neither the partners nor the partnership assumed any
personal liability. Under Code section 752,80 the partners' bases included
their proportionate share of the nonrecourse liability. From this basis each
partner took his share of the loss and depreciation deductions, resulting in
an adjusted basis of $1,455,740. Due to adverse economic conditions the
venture failed, and each partner sold his interest to a third party. The
buyer agreed to pay selling expenses up to $250 and took the apartment
complex subject to the $1,851,000 mortgage. By this time, the fair market
value of the complex had fallen to $1,400,000. Citing Crane and Millar,
the Tax Court held that the partners realized the full $1,851,000. s' Like
Millar, the Tufts court concluded that the result was consistent with
Crane, and rejected footnote 37 as a dictum.82
Although Millar and Tufts reached an equitable result and are in con-
formity with the tax equity language of Crane, their conclusion that the
receipt of a prior tax advantage may constitute an amount realized on the
disposition of property obscures the theoretical basis and statutory defini-
tion of amount realized. The statutory definition of amount realized en-
compasses only money or property received as consideration for the
transfer of property. 3 Even decisions that have expanded the concept of
amount realized beyond the literal receipt of money or property have
found that the benefits realized have a substantially similar economic ef-
fect to the receipt of money or property from the transferee.8 4 Further-
more, emphasis on the presence of an economic benefit as essential to the
79. 70 T.C. 756 (1978).
80. I.R.C. § 752. For a general discussion of I.R.C. § 752, see Epstein, The Application
of the Crane Doctrine to Limited Partnerships, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 100, 105 (1972); Perry,
Limited Partnershps and Tax Shelters- The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAX. L. REV. 525,
542 (1972).
81. 70 T.C. at 768-70.
82. In rejecting footnote 37, the Millar court stated,
First, it must be remembered that the footnote in Crane was dictum. Further-
more, the footnote was but a postulate or hypothetical observation with re-
spect to a hypothetical set of facts not before the Court . . . .Viewed in that
perspective, we believe that the rationale of the Supreme Court's principal
reasoning, analysis and holding in Crane is more clearly the measure by which
the transaction subjudice should be decided.
577 F.2d at 215-16.
83. See note I supra.
84. United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938), justified the inclusion of recourse
liability assumed by a buyer as an amount realized by the seller on the theory that the
economic effect was the same as if the buyer has provided the seller with cash to pay off the
mortgage. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1
(1947), found that the transfer of property subject to a nonrecourse liability could result in
an amount realized on the theory that a borrower would treat a nonrecourse liability as if he
were personally liable on the debt; therefore, the reasoning of Hendler could be extended to
the nonrecourse situation.
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concept of amount realized is supported by the Crane opinion. Had the
Crane Court been able to justify inclusion of Mrs. Crane's nonrecourse
debt as an amount realized solely on the basis of tax equity, it would not
have relied so heavily on the fiction that personal liability can be implied
whenever the value of the securing asset is equal to or greater than the debt
for which no personal liability in fact exists. The court further would not
have created an exception to its rule-footnote 37.
Because of the refusal of courts to recognize that prior tax benefits are
not within the scope of amount realized, taxpayers have advanced alterna-
tive arguments designed to circumvent the courts' disregard of the eco-
nomic benefit theory. For example, in Tufts the taxpayers argued that if
footnote 37 did not limit the amount realized to the fair market value of
the property on the date of disposition, then Code section 752(c) did.85 In
general, section 752 pertains to the tax treatment of contributions by part-
ners to the partnership, of distributions by the partnership to the partners,
and of sales or exchanges of partnership interests. Under section 752(a) a
partner's basis will increase as his share of the partnership liabilities in-
creases. Conversely, section 752(b) requires a decrease in a partner's basis
as his share of the partnership liabilities decreases. Section 752(c) provides
that liabilities on partnership property will be included in the partner's
basis only to the extent of the fair market value of the encumbered prop-
erty. The taxpayers in Tufts argued that the fair market value limitation
on basis in section 752(c) applied to the amount realized provision on sale
of partnership interests under section 752(d), which provides that sales or
exchanges of partnership interests will be given the same treatment as sales
or exchanges of nonpartnership property. The court rejected this conten-
tion," concluding that the legislative history8 7and the regulations 88 relat-
ing to section 752(c) were substantial evidence that section 752(d) was
85. 70 T.C. at 766. Section 752 provides:
§ 752. Treatment of certain liabilities
(a) Increase in partner's liabilities.-Any increase in a partner's share of
the liabilities of a partnership, or any increase in a partner's individual liabili-
ties by reason of the assumption by such partner of partnership liabilities,
shall be considered as a contribution of money by such partner to the partner-
ship.
(b) Decrease in partner's liabilities-Any decrease in a partner's share of
the liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a partner's individual liabili-
ties by reason of the assumption by the partnership of such individual liabili-
ties, shall be considered as a distribution of money to the partner by the
partnership.
(c) Liability to which property is subject.-For purposes of this section, a
liability to which property is subject shall, to the extent of the fair market
value of such property, be considered as a liability of the owner of the prop-
erty.
(d) Sale or exchange of an interest.-In the case of a sale or exchange of
an interest in a partnership, liabilities shall be treated in the same manner as
liabilities in connection with the sale or exchange of property not associated
with partnerships.
86. 70 T.C. at 767.
87. The legislative history of§ 752 can be found in H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. A236 (1954) and S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 405 (1954).
88. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(c) (1960).
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intended to operate independently of section 752(c).8 9 Thus, the court held
that section 752(c) applied only where a partner had contributed encum-
bered property to the partnership within section 752(a), or when the part-
nership had distributed encumbered property to the partner within section
752(b).90
The court also noted that section 752 is generally regarded as a codifica-
tion of the Crane basis rule.9 Reasoning that the taxpayer's interpretation
of the interplay between subsections 752(c) and 752(d) would result in the
type of double deduction Crane sought to prohibit, the court concluded
that Congress could not have intended to codify Crane and at the same
time legislate the very result Crane sought to prevent.92 The court thus
found that because section 752(d) treats the sale of partnership interests in
the same manner as the sale of nonpartnership property, the amount real-
ized must include the nonrecourse indebtedness on the authority of Mil-
/ar.9
3
In the recent case of Estate of Delman v. Commissioner 94 the Tax Court
examined the tax consequences of the repossession of equipment that had
been purchased by nonrecourse financing. Taxpayers, general partners in
Equipment Leasing Company (ELC), had organized ELC and National
Teleproductions Corporation (NTP) for the purpose of acquiring a mobile
television van and entering into the business of producing television pro-
grams. Under a sales contract for the purchase of the necessary equip-
ment, NTP made a down payment and agreed to pay the balance of
$1,284,612 in installments. NTP then entered into a sale-leaseback trans-
action with ELC, and ELC took the equipment subject to the nonrecourse
debt. When ELC failed to make the payments on the balance due under
the sales contract, the equipment was repossessed.
When the partnership acquired the equipment, the partners took a basis
of $1,294,612. By the time the equipment was repossessed, the partners
had taken allowable depreciation in the amount of $779,986.20, leaving
them with an adjusted basis of $504,625.80. The balance due under the
sales contract was $1,182,542.07, and the fair market value of the equip-
ment had fallen to $400,000.
The taxpayers advanced three novel arguments to avoid the recognition
of gain in the footnote 37 situation. The taxpayers first argued that section
11195 precluded a finding that an amount had been realized under section
89. 70 T.C. at 767-69.
90. Id at 769. The fair market value language of§ 752(c) is also not a limitation on the
determination of a partner's cost basis. Brountas v. Commissioner, [1980] DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA) No. 2, H-I (T.C. Jan. 3, 1980).
91. 70 T.C. at 767; see A. WILLIS, WILLIS ON PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 195 (1971);
Perry, supra note 80, at 542.
92. 70 T.C. at 769.
93. Id at 769-70.
94. [1979] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380, at 4064.
95. I.R.C. § I II provides: "(a) Generalule.-Gross income does not include income
attributable to the recovery during the taxable year of a bad debt, prior tax, or delinquency
amount, to the extent of the amount of the recovery exclusion with respect to such debt, tax,
or amount."
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1001(b). Section 111, the statutory tax benefit rule,9 6 provides generally
that if a deduction is taken in one year and there is a recovery of the previ-
ously deducted item in a subsequent year, the recovery must be treated as
income to the taxpayer.97 Only the amount that resulted in a tax benefit in
the year of deduction, however, is treated as income.98 Case law99 and the
regulations" have required that there be an actual recovery of the previ-
ously deducted item in the subsequent year before the tax benefit rule can
be invoked. The recovery can take the form of an actual receipt of money
or other property,'0 ' or the freeing of assets resulting in an increase in the
taxpayer's net worth. 102 In Delman the taxpayers argued that the recovery
requirement of the tax benefit rule had not been met because they had
received no money or other property on the repossession and had not ex-
perienced an increase in net worth on being released from the nonrecourse
indebtedness. The taxpayers insisted, therefore, that they realized no eco-
nomic benefit and that the court was precluded from finding that an
amount had been realized. The court rejected this argument, citing Crane
and concluding that the statutory tax benefit rule was not applicable to the
transfer of nonrecourse financed property.'0 3 The Delman court empha-
sized that although the plaintiff in Crane had neither received cash in the
amount of the depreciation she had taken nor been discharged from a lia-
bility resulting in an increase in her net worth, the Supreme Court never-
theless found that she had realized an amount that included her
nonrecourse mortgage."° The Delman court thus concluded that the tax-
payers had taken the tax benefit language out of context and that the cases
cited in support of the taxpayers' argument were "theoretically and factu-
ally" distinct from the case at bar.0 5
96. By its terms, § I I I applies only to bad debts, prior taxes, and delinquency amounts.
Its scope, however, has been broadened by regulations to include all other "losses, expendi-
tures, and accruals made the basis of deductions from gross income for prior taxable years."
Treas. Reg. § 1.111 - l(a) (1960). The regulations further provide that § Ill does not apply
with respect to depreciation deductions. Id
97. See J. CHOMMIE, supra note 61, § 90.
98. See, e.g., Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
99. Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1970) (tax benefit rule not applicable because
there was no recovery); Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 840 (9th Cir.
1963) (deductions for cost of growing crops not income under tax benefit theory where ele-
ment of actual recovery is lacking).
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.11 l-l(a)(2) (1960).
101. See, e.g., Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 298 (1946) (re-
fund of excise taxes previously deducted is a recovery for the purpose of the tax benefit rule);
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1952) (repayment of a
previously deducted bad debt is a recovery for purpose of tax benefit rule).
102. See, e.g., Bear Mfg. Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1970) (previ-
ously deducted liability expense is recovered when liability terminates); cf. Tennessee Caro-
lina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440, 451 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., joined by six
justices dissenting) (liquidating distribution of stock does not cause a corporate taxpayer to
receive an economic benefit).
103. [1979] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380, at 4074.
104. Id
105. Id at 4079 n.5. Although the Delman court is correct in concluding that the tax
benefit cases cited by the taxpayers are factually distinct from Millar, Tufts, and Delman, the
theoretical distinction is less clear. Under § 111 and Millar and Tufts, a taxpayer is made to
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The taxpayers next urged that Millar and Tufts be overruled. '0 6 Specifi-
cally, the taxpayers claimed that Millar and Tufts unjustifiably relied on
Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 10 7 Mendham Corp. v. Com-
missioner,08 and Lutz & Schramm Co. v. Commissioner'0 9 in support of
their holdings that the full unpaid balance of a nonrecourse indebtedness
is includable as an amount realized."o The taxpayers sought to distin-
guish the latter group of cases on the ground that each involved a post-
acquisition refinancing. When funds are borrowed against property subse-
quent to 'its original acquisition, the borrower is free to use the funds for
his personal benefit rather than apply them to the property. ' In contrast,
purchase-money financing must be used against the property and is in-
cluded in basis." 2 Emphasizing this distinction, Woodsam, Mendham,
and Lutz & Schramm held that the amount of the subsequent refinancing
was realized when the taxpayers transferred the encumbered property in
discharge of the debt because a direct cash benefit had resulted.' 3 The
taxpayers in Delman asserted that because they had not been free to use
the funds for their own benefit, Woodsam, Mendham, and Lutz &
Schramm were inapposite, and thus they had realized no income. The
court dismissed this argument, concluding that the tax benefit rationale
underlying the Millar and Tufts decisions was sufficient to justify its hold-
ing.' 4 Nevertheless, the court did make some noteworthy comments in
response to the taxpayers' challenge. The court stated that it saw little dif-
ference between the economic benefits resulting from the use of purchase
money financing and post-acquisition financing." 5 The court concluded
that regardless of the type of underlying financing, the taxpayer is still able
to enjoy the use of property without risking any of his own funds' 16 and
thereby enjoy the benefit of having this amount freed for use elsewhere." 7
account for deductions that were proper when taken, even though they subsequently turned
out to be unjustified. In the case of a bad debt, the deduction is allowed under § 166. When
the debt is later repayed, § I I I requires that the taxpayer account for the prior deduction in
the year of recovery because the deduction is no longer warranted. The same basic theory
was explicitly applied in Millar and Tufts and was recognized in Crane. In those cases
nonrecourse debt had been included in basis and depreciation computed thereon on the
theory that a capital investment in the amount of the debt and the allowable depreciation
would be made at some future time. See Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340, 352
(1966), acq. 1969-1 C.B. 21. When the property was later transferred and it became appar-
ent that the anticipated investment had not occurred, the holdings of those cases required
the taxpayer to account for the depreciation previously allowed in excess of actual invest-
ment.
106. [1979] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380, at 4079 n.3.
107. 16 T.C. 649 (1951), ajft'd, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
108. 9 T.C. 320 (1947).
109. 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
110. [1979] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380, at 4074 n.5.
Ill. If the funds are applied to the property, then an adjustment to basis results. I.R.C.
§ 1016(a)(1); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1016-2(a) & (b) (1960).
112. 1.R.C. § 1012.
113. 16 T.C. at 654; 9 T.C. at 323; 1 T.C. at 689.
114. [1979] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380, at 4079 n.5.
115. Id.; accord, Halpern, supra note 47, at 218-21.
116. [1979] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380, at 4079 n.5.
117. Id. at 4074.
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Although the Delman court is correct in concluding that a taxpayer bene-
fits from the use of borrowed funds, this benefit is not realized on the
transfer of the property, and therefore it is questionable whether it prop-
erly may be considered an amount realized.
Finally, the taxpayers argued that a recognized exception to the cancel-
lation of indebtedness doctrine, first enunciated in United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co. , 18 was applicable to their case. Under the Kirby rule, cancel-
lation of an indebtedness results in income to a taxpayer because his assets
have been freed, resulting in an increase in net worth." 9 An exception to
this rule occurs when the taxpayer remains insolvent after the debt cancel-
lation. 2° Under the insolvency exception no income is realized, on the
theory that the taxpayer has not realized an increase in net worth.' 2 ' The
taxpayers in Delman argued that because the partnership was insolvent
before and after the repossession, the insolvency exception to the Kirby
rule applied, and they realized no income. The court held, however, that
Kirby and its exceptions applied only when indebtedness was discharged,
and not when nonrecourse-financed property was transferred. 22 The
court reasoned that the repossession resulted in no change in the taxpayers'
net worth because the taxpayers were not personally liable on the indebt-
edness.' 23 Therefore, because the Kirby rule was inapplicable, the insol-
vency exception was irrelevant. In so holding, the court again emphasized
that the basis for its decision lay in the tax equity approach employed in
Millar and TufS. 124
The most recent Tax Court case, Brountas v. Commissioner125 further
evidences this emphasis on tax equity consequences. In Brountas the Tax
118. 284 U.S. 1 (1931). Kirby held that a corporate taxpayer, when it purchased its own
bonds in the open market at a discount, realized income because of the resulting increase in
the corporation's net worth. The Kirby doctrine is codified in I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(12), 108, 1017.
See also Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949) (repurchase of bonds at a discount
results in taxable income). For a discussion of the theory of cancellation of indebtedness,
see Blattner, Debt Cancellation, 30 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 237 (1972).
119. See generally, J. CHOMMIE, supra note 61, § 13.
120. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(b) (1960). Other exceptions to the cancellation of indebt-
edness doctrine exist. No taxable income arises if the debt release is a contribution to corpo-
rate capital, Hartland Assocs. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1580 (1970); if the debt cancellation
was in fact merely a reduction in the purchase price, Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656
(7th Cir. 1940); if a gift was intended, Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949);
Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943); or if there is a release to a partner-
ship qualifying as a distribution of partnership assets, Stackhouse v. United States, 441 F.2d
465 (5th Cir. 1971).
121. See, e.g.,Transylvania R.R. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 69, 72 (4th Cir. 1938); Cones-
toga Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 506, 513 (1951); Quinn v. Commissioner, 31
B.TA. 142, 145 (1934).
122. [1979] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380, at 4075. For a general discussion
of the applicability of Kirby to the transfer of nonrecourse financed property, see Del Cotto,
supra note 44, at 76-79.
123. [1979] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380, at 4075; accord, Hotel Astoria,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 759 (1940); Fulton Gold Corp., 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934); cf
Blattner, supra note 118, at 252-53 (concluding discharge of nonrecourse debt does result in
increase in taxpayer's net worth).
124. [1979] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (73 T.C.) Dec. 36,380, at 4075.
125. [1980] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 2, H-1 (T.C. Jan. 3, 1980).
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Court held that, because the amount realized by a taxpayer in the disposi-
tion of nonrecourse financed property includes the face amount of the in-
debtedness,' 26 the taxpayer's cost basis must also include the amount of
the nonrecourse indebtedness, unlimited by the fair market value of the
securing asset.127 The holding recognizes that if a taxpayer will be disad-
vantaged by having to include the full amount of the indebtedness as an
amount realized on disposition, tax equity and the symmetrical relation-
ship between basis and amount realized require that the taxpayer be given
the full tax benefit he will be charged with on disposition by allowing him
to include also the full amount of the indebtedness in his basis.'2 The
court thus relied on principles of symmetry and equity to reach a determi-
nation of a taxpayer's cost basis that has no necessary relationship with the
actual amount of the taxpayer's reasonably anticipated capital invest-
ment. 129 Existing Tax Court precedent now clearly establishes the use of a
tax equity approach to justify inclusion of the full amount of nonrecourse
indebtedness, regardless of the fair market value of the securing asset, as
both an amount realized on disposition130and as an element of cost basis
on acquisition, despite the emphasis placed on the value of the underlying
security in Crane v. Commissioner, the seminal decision in this area, and
the only Supreme Court case on point.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
Several commentators have offered alternative approaches to the foot-
note 37 situation that would achieve the equitable result of Millar, Tufts,
and Delman, yet not disturb the traditional scope of amount realized. One
proposal suggests that the amount of the depreciation deductions should
be calculated based on the sum of the taxpayer's actual cash contributions
plus the face amount of the nonrecourse financing, while at the same time,
the deductions should be limited to the taxpayer's equity investment.131
Thus, to deduct the full amount of depreciation allowable, the taxpayer's
payments on the mortgage must keep pace. It is suggested, however, that
this solution is unworkable as it distorts income by underestimating the
portion of the asset's actual economic cost attributable to the early
126. The Tax Court cited to Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978), appeal docketed,
No. 79-2258 (5th Cir. Apr. 23, 1979).
127. [1980] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 2, H-I, H-13 (T.C. Jan. 3, 1980).
128. Judicial recognition of the symmetrical relationship between basis and amount real-
ized now appears to have come full circle. In Millar, Tufts, and Delman, for example, the
Tax Court emphasized that if nonrecourse indebtedness is included in basis, symmetry re-
quires that it must also be included in amount realized. Brountas recognized the inverse of
this proposition in holding that when nonrecourse liability is included as an amount real-
ized, it must also be included in basis.
129. Id.
130. See also Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2, [1979] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
(U.S. Tax Cas.) 8911 (fair market value not relevant to determination of amount realized).
131. See Del Cotto, supra note 44, at 98-99; Perry, supra note 80, at 539; Note, Tax
Consequences of the Disposition ofProperty Subject to an Unassumed Mortgage, 49 COLUM.
L. REV. 845, 851 (1949).
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years.' 32 Furthermore, amortization of the debt in high income years
would allow the taxpayer to control the timing of his deductions. 133 The
most fundamental objection to such an approach, or to any other sugges-
tion limiting the amount of depreciation allowable, however, 134 is section
465.135 Section 465 excepts real estate from the at-risk limitations, evi-
dencing strong congressional intent to maintain real estate tax shelters. 1
36
Recognizing that judicial expansion of the historical scope of amount
realized is not necessarily the best avenue for change, one commentator
has suggested that Congress should be called upon to amend section
1001(b) to include nonrecourse indebtedness as an amount realized with-
out regard to the value of the underlying security. 137 It has also been sug-
gested that section 111 could be broadened to bring deductions taken in
excess of actual investment within the reach of the tax benefit rule.'38 Stat-
utory solutions such as these are especially meritorious since it is well-
settled that it is the province of Congress, not the judiciary, to remove
inequities that result from consistent application of existing law.' 39 Thus,
Millar and Tufts are inappropriate attempts at judicial expansion of a stat-
utorily codified area of the law.
Yet another appealing alternative appears in a recent article by James
Halpern. 4 ' Halpern suggests that footnote 37 is a "problem that never
really was."' 4 ' He theorizes that "[flootnote 37 presents no problem if it is
viewed only as a warning that the theory of the case then before the Court
[Crane v. Commissioner], although adequate to deal with the facts of the
case, might not be adequate to deal with the facts of a harder one." 4 2 The
issue then becomes what theory the Court would have used had it been
presented in fact with the more difficult footnote 37 case. There are several
possible answers to this question. First, it is arguable that the Court re-
sponded to this issue in the closing language of Crane. Recognizing that a
double deduction would result if Mrs. Crane's tax benefits were not ac-
counted for, the Court stated, "The Sixteenth Amendment does not re-
quire that result any more than does the Act itself."' 43 This language may
indicate that the Court would employ a tax equity approach, as did Millar,
Tufts, and Delman, were the footnote 37 case before the Court."' Sec-
132. Perry, supra note 80, at 539.
133. Id. at 540; see note 28 supra.
134. See Del Cotto, supra note 44, at 101-02, in which the author suggests that the gain
on the disposition of property should be recaptured expressly as ordinary income to the
extent the taxpayer's depreciation deductions exceed his equity investment. This suggestion
has been criticized on the grounds that it lacks theoretical support and creates a large admin-
istrative burden. Perry, supra note 80, at 540.
135. See note 62 supra.
136. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D).
137. McGuire, supra note 49, at 1467.
138. Id. at 1467-68.
139. See, e.g., Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 403 n.5 (1967).
140. Halpern, supra note 47.
141. Id
142. Id. at 224.
143. 331 U.S. at 16.
144. Halpern, supra note 47, at 225.
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ondly, it is possible to identify an economic benefit in the full amount of
the nonrecourse debt if the focus is not narrowed to the value received at
the time the property is transferred. Halpern makes use of this concept
stating:
[T]he potential amount that can be realized if the property is trans-
ferred still subject to the mortgage should in no way be restricted to
the time-of-transfer value of the property.
In any case. . . it is the value of what was received at that time (i.e.,
when the present holder acquired the mortgage) that counts. If value
at least equal to the mortgage was then received, that is the receiqt
that counts; that is the receipt that can give rise to a full measure of
realized gain under Section 1001 if the property is transferred before
the mortgage has been fully repaid.' 45
The Court might indeed find such an approach appealing in that it is con-
sistent with Crane's attempt to identify an economic benefit before holding
that an amount had been realized. This approach, however, ignores the
fact that amount realized, by definition, refers to the benefit received by a
taxpayer on disposition, not on acquisition."' It may be bending the stat-
utory language of section 1001(b) too far to conclude that it is broad
enough to relate back to benefits received on acquisition.
It is noteworthy that all of the offered alternatives rely either on the
expansion of the concept of amount realized or on limiting the amount of
depreciation allowable. Perhaps a more logical solution would be to focus
on basis. The inequity in the footnote 37 situation arises because nonre-
course debt is included as part of a taxpayer's cost basis on the assumption
that the debt will be satisfied eventually, 47 an assumption that hindsight
proves to be false. As it is the original basis calculation that has proved
inaccurate, the more logical solution would be to make a basis adjustment
to reflect the actual cost to the taxpayer. The basis adjustment would be
made in an amount equal to the excess of the nonrecourse debt over the
fair market value of the property at the time of disposition, because it is
this amount that the lender cannot satisfy either by proceeding against the
property or the debtor. Such a basis adjustment will effect the recapture of
deductions taken in excess of actual investment without relying on an arti-
ficial concept of amount realized. This result is demonstrated by the fol-
lowing hypothetical:
Acquisition
Indebtedness $100x (100% nonrecourse debt)
Cost Basis $100x
Adjusted Basis $ 60x
Fair Market Value on
Disposition $ 70x
Under Millar, Tufts, and Delman the amount realized on this transaction
would be $100x, the unpaid balance of the nonrecourse debt. The tax-
145. Id at 221 (emphasis in original).
146. I.R.C. § 1001(b).
147. Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. 1969-1 C.B. 21.
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payer's gain would thus be $40x. This is equal to the amount of deprecia-
tion taken in excess of investment. Using the alternative basis adjustment,
a gain of $40x also results. Under this approach the amount realized
equals the fair market value of the property on disposition, $70x. As the
basis must be adjusted to reflect the actual cost to the taxpayer, basis
would equal $30x, rather than $60x, resulting in a gain of $40x. This anal-
ysis avoids an artificial calculation of amount realized, and is consistent
with traditional notions of accounting for prior tax benefits by an adjust-
ment to cost basis. 14
8
Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 4 9 although conflicting with the
Tax Court's opinion in Brountas v. Commissioner,5 ' supports the notion
that cost basis must accurately reflect the actual cost of an asset to a tax-
payer. In Gibson Products the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas held that nonrecourse indebtedness is not includable
in cost basis when the debt is a contingent one,' 5 1 or when the fair market
148. For example, § 1017 allows an adjustment to basis when indebtedness for which a
deduction was allowed is discharged.
149. 460 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1978). In Gibson Products the taxpayer, a limited
partner in an oil and gas drilling venture, gave a single nonrecourse note to secure both the
purchase price of five oil and gas leases and an agreement with the vendor of the leases to
lfill certain drilling obligations. The note was secured by the oil and gas leases, the operat-
ing equipment on the leases owned by the limited partnership, and eight percent of all hy-
drocarbons produced by any well on any of the leases. The court noted that it could be
concluded on the facts that the debt was not a bona fide debt, but rather an equity interest.
Under I.R.C. § 705, an equity interest would have no effect on the taxpayer's basis in the
partnership. See also Backar v. Western States Producing Co., 547 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1977).
The court declined to base its decision on this point, however, due to the parties' relative
inattention to the issue. 460 F. Supp. at 1120.
150. [1980] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 2, H-I (T.C. Jan. 3, 1980); see text at note 126
supra. Support for the court's approach in Gibson Products can be found in Rev. Rul. 79-
432, [1980] 10 FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6272, to appear in 1979-53 I.R.B. 20, which holds
that a taxpayer's cost basis in an art tax shelter is limited to the fair market value of the
property securing a nonrecourse note. See also Rev. Ruls. 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62; 77-110,
1977-1 C.B. 58.
151. Generally, if a note is payable from profits only, it is a contingent obligation be-
cause there is no guarantee there will be any profits. Redford v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 773,
777 (1957). In Gibson Products the court found that the obligation to satisfy the debt rested
completely on the amount of oil and gas produced by the purchased leases. 460 F. Supp. at
1114. See also Rodman v. Commissioner, 542 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976); Denver & Rio
Grande W. R.R. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1266 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Columbus & G. Ry. v. Com-
missioner, 42 T.C. 834 (1964), aff'dper curiam, 358 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
827 (1966); Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831 (1963). The outer limit of
the contingent liability cases is Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966). In Mayerson
the court held that a taxpayer who purchased a 79-year lease with substantial nonrecourse
financing could include the debt in basis. The court so held despite the fact that the parties
agreed to reduce the face amount of the note if it were paid off in the first two years, and if
not paid then, no payments were due for 99 years. The court rejected the Commissioner's
argument that these facts rendered the liability contingent. But see Del Cotto, supra note 44,
at 80-82, in which it is argued that repayment in Mayerson was contingent and so highly
unlikely that it should not have been included in basis. Del Cotto argues that even if the
liability were not contingent, the likelihood of amortization at the end of 99 years was so
slight as to justify exclusion of the debt in basis. Id. at 82.
The Service acquiesed in Mayerson, 1969-1 C.B. 21, based solely on the fact that an arm's-
length transaction creating a bona fide purchase and debt obligation clearly was involved.
The Service stated, however, that it would scrutinize any transaction set up for the sole
purpose of improperly creating or deflating depreciation deductions. 1969-1 C.B. at 59. See
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value of the property securing the indebtedness does not at least equal the
face amount of the nonrecourse indebtedness. 5 2 The Court cited favora-
bly the economic benefit rationale advanced in Crane and footnote 37153
and reasoned that when the value of property securing a nonrecourse in-
debtedness does not at least equal the amount of that indebtedness, it no
longer can be assumed that the taxpayer will eventually make a capital
contribution in this amount.'54 Thus, inclusion of the debt in cost basis is
unwarranted.' 55 Although Gibson Products focused on the determination
of cost basis at acquisition of the property, its basic premise was that cost
basis must be reflective of actual cost. There appears to be no reason why
this premise cannot be applied statutorily to require a retroactive basis ad-
justment at subsequent disposition when it becomes clear that a taxpayer
will not make the anticipated capital contribution that justified including
the amount of the debt in basis in the first instance.
V. CONCLUSION
The key to the resolution of the footnote 37 issue lies in the definition of
amount realized. The basic issue is whether amount realized is limited to
the receipt on the transfer of property of an economic benefit having the
effect of a receipt of cash or property, or whether the amount realized can
be expanded, without statutory amendment, to include the prior receipt of
some tax advantage. If amount realized is limited to economic benefits
received on the transfer of property, footnote 37 must attain the status of
law, for it cannot be said that a taxpayer who transfers property subject to
a nonrecourse indebtedness greater than the property's value receives an
economic benefit to the extent of the face amount of that indebtedness. A
also Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (denying deprecia-
tion deductions where taxpayer had no equity investment and the debt had economic signifi-
cance only if the property later appreciated in value); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d
734 (2d Cir. 1966) (denying depreciation deductions where taxpayer had no reason to en-
gage in transaction except to secure deduction), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
152. 460 F. Supp. at 1115. Cf Brountas v. Commissioner, 119801 DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA) No. 2, H-1, H-13 (T.C. Jan. 3, 1980) (holding fair market value to be immaterial to
the determination of cost basis). The court in Gibson Products applied the law as it existed
in 1972. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4) was therefore inapplicable.
153. 460 F. Supp. at 1117.
154. Id
155. The holding in Gibson Products is consistent with earlier decisions holding that ex-
cess debt over fair market value is not includable as part of a taxpayer's cost basis. See
Morris v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 21 (1972) (worthless debt used solely to inflate the true cost
of property in order to acquire a high depreciable basis cannot be included as cost basis),
acq. 1973-2 C.B. 3; Marcus v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1263 (1971) (debt upon
which taxpayer routinely defaults and fails to make interest payments is illusory and not
includable in basis); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966) (denying de-
preciation deductions where a taxpayer had no reason to engage in the transaction except to
receive the deduction); Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58 (ruling that as the taxpayer could
not prove the value of the property at least equalled the debt, the debt could not become a
part of the taxpayer's basis). But see Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973) (100%
financing approved as part of basis). For a general discussion of the Service's challenges to
inclusion of debt in basis, see Rabinowitz, Real Estate and Federal Income Tax: The Status
ofthe Law Today, 32 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1593, 1598-1602 (1974).
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taxpayer benefits, or receives income subject to taxation on the disposition
of encumbered property, only to the extent that his assets are freed by
relief from the indebtedness. Thus, on the transfer of property encum-
bered by nonrecourse indebtedness, the economic benefit, the amount real-
ized, may never exceed the fair market value of the property.
Equitable considerations demand, however, that excess depreciation
taken over investment be accounted for on a subsequent disposition of the
property. This can be accomplished in one of several ways. First, the
courts can force the judicial expansion of the notion of economic benefit to
include the advantage secured when a taxpayer claims deductions in ex-
cess of actual investment, as an amount realized. Millar, Tufts, and Del-
man do exactly that. This method, however, represents an unwarranted
judicial usurpation of the legislative function. If the recapture of excess
depreciation taken over investment is to be effected by including nonre-
course debt as an amount realized, a more appropriate alternative would
be to call upon Congress to amend the Internal Revenue Code in one of
several ways. Congress could amend section 1001(b) to include excess de-
preciation as an amount realized. Alternatively, section 111 could be
amended to require taxation of excess depreciation under the tax benefit
rule. It is suggested, however, that the same result can be obtained without
an artificial expansion of the amount realized provision by statutorily re-
quiring an adjustment to cost basis in the footnote 37 situation. A retroac-
tive adjustment to cost basis is theoretically more correct than an artificial
addition to amount realized when the literal definition of amount realized
in section 1001(b) fails to achieve an equitable result in the footnote 37
situation. In light of the conceptual difficulties arising from the applica-
tion of existing precedent, statutory amendment appears to be the only
proper solution.
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